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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE or IJIAH, in the interest of: 
BABY GIRL c!ARIE, 
Case No. 14599 
A Person Under Eighteen Years of Age 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the natural mother from an Order and 
Judgment of the Juvenile Court entered on January 9, 1975, permanently 
deprivin~ her of all parental rights in connection ~ith her child, baby 
girl ~·!arie; and from a decision of the Juvenile Court on May 4, 1976, 
rcfus1nc to ~a-ate and •et aside as null and void its order entered on 
January 9, 1975. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Juvenile Court, upon petition of the Utah Division of 
Family Services, found that the natural mother was unable to provide 
adequately for all the needs of said child and agreed that it was in 
the beot interest ,,f said child for parental rights to be terminated 
and for said child t0 be placed for adoption. On April 22, 1976, a 
hearinc ~a· held at ~hicl1 the Juvenile Court refuseJ to vacate and set 
'·L ur:r Seier !I' , 1;; AP PE...I.L 
r:,e ap;,cllant seeks to have the order of the Juvenile Court, 
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terminating the appellant's parental rights, set aside as null and void 
because it was entered beyond the dispositional power of the Juvenile 
Court under the particular circumstances of this case. Also, the appel-
lant seeks reversal of the decision of the Juvenile Court, entered on 
May 4, 1976, refusing to vacate and set aside the Court's order of 
January 9, 1975. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant takes exception to respondent's Statement of the 
Facts in the following respects: 
1. The respondent's brief states of the appellant that "She 
appeared at Court intent upon giving up the baby. After a probing dis-
cussion with the Court she restated her previous decision that it "'as 
in the best interests of the child to give it up and voluntarilv did so 
in open court." (Respondent's Brief, 2). Appellant asserts that this 
is simply not true. The transcript of the January 9, 1975, hearing 
clearly shows that the natural mother wanted to keep her child and that 
she thought it best that the child remain in a foster home where it had 
already been placed for a one (1) year period. (Tr. 3, January 9, 1975' 
2. Respondent's Statement of Facts also indicates that there 
is no direct testimony that either the DFS Social \-lorkcr or the appd-
lant's parents were advising or, in the one case, demandin~ that she 
release her child for adoption. (Respondent's llrief, 2 ,, ) '. Appellant 
asserts, to the contrary, that the transcript oi the Januar: "· 1'17), 
hearing could hardly evidence extreme parental prcsS>tr<' tu rclinr:11isl, a 
child for adoption with more clarity. As for the position •I t•i :, , : '"' 
-2-
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petition for termination of parental rights speaks for itself. All of 
these mat'=ers • .. •ould have been completely supported by direct evidence 
!1ad the Ju•Jenile court not refused to hear testimony on these very 
issues at the April 22, 1976, hearing on appellant's petition to vacate 
a~d set aside the termination of appellant's parental rights. This re-
fusal was objected to by the appellant at the April 22, 1976, hearing. 
nr. lo, April 22, 1976) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
rHE J'.-.c::;ru: ClllJF.i HAD JURISDICTION TO VACATE ITS PREVIOUSLY 
ENTERE'I c>RDER. 
~espondent has argued that District Courts have excl-'cve jur-
isdiction c•ver adoption proceedings. With this the appellant completely 
ac:rees. However, the respondent has submitted that once an adoption 
necitiun is ::iled tite ~~istrict court's _1urisu!_ctior. lS 11 paramount in 
Jecidin~ all issues necessarv to the adoption, including whether or not 
Appellant voluntarilv consented to termination of the parental rights 
and whether or not she was afforded due process in the termination pro-
ceedin,~." (Respondent's Brief, 5) 
I:c ··;ppc1rt of t~is contentiol' respondent has cited In Re 
:rin.bles' .-'\d,•pll<Jr:. 1• .rtah 2d 18tl, J9H P.2d 25 ,,rtail l9b5). The appel-
lant ..-;qhmit-., t11at t11t:rc ts a fundamental difference between the circum-
',: Jn Ll' al \a< .. wd c~te r.1a~tl'r n,,~· hefore this court. In Trimble 
----
,-: , r .•r .,,,, 1t a' ti rst necessarY to submit the issue 
t l llt ,,, a ,Jetenlinatic'n before the adoption 
;1r ,, t , ,1 
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1953, as amended, specifically covers the question and the decision in 
Trimble was correctly reached. However, in the appellant's situation 
the Juvenile Court already had jurisdiction over the child Babv Girl 
Marie; and although the Juvenile Court is a creature of statute, with 
limited jurisdiction, Section 55-10-65, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, speci-
fically establishes the Juvenile Court as a court of equal status ~.•ith 
the district courts of this state in those limited areas of its juris-
diction. So, while the district court may decide all issues pertinent 
to an adoption, it is submitted that once the juvenile court's juris-
diction has previously been invoked, that the district court may not 
oust the jurisdiction of the juvenile court simply because an adoption 
petition has been filed. Indeed, to hold otherwise would permit the 
district court, to which the juvenile court has equal status in its 
limited jurisdictional areas, to sit in review as a quasi-appellate bod\· 
over juvenile court decisions. This is not permitted under Section 
55-10-65. 
By statute and prior case law precedent the Juvenile Courts 
have the inherent power to modify or vacate a previously entered erro-
neous order. (See Appellant's Brief, Point II). As a court of equal 
status with the district courts, should a juvenile LOurt exercise tl1e 
power granted to it by Section 55-l!l-l!lh and morlit·· ,,r vacat~ an errc'-
neous order, its decision must be equally binding upon the district 
court because in those limited areas h'herL·in t!tc JlJ\'L·n' l•_ Lnttrt lJ.l" 
already established its juri.<:>diction, it \1a<-. L_·x<- l11 1\L l 1 "'tlldl Jllrl...__ 
diction under statutory lac1. Section ))-liJ-7/ ''·' •. ,!f1t('ri'll I • 
It is submitted that even though an adoption has rntl'rV<'ned, d leVI<' 
a termination order i~ 1)nly proper in tilL ~)'lJ r-,.,,H I .Jt • 
-4-
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or~ that, rccarrlless of the nature of a proceeding in the district court, 
·-~,.. ']i<:;t;ir t court "lav nnt sit ac; an appellate or revie't·] hody over prior 
1 ,.,_.111 lr:-: cn 1 1rt dec i c i O""' • 
Respondent has further argued that the Juvenile Court in any 
event terminated its jurisdiction over the child on December 4, 1975, 
therebv mooting the issues of this appeal. However, appellant asserts 
that the issues raised in this appeal are indeed anything but moot. 
Appellant was not afforded due process at the termination hearing in 
that she was not informed of a right to appeal. The error was in the 
Ju\'enile Court, not the appellant; and at the very least, in a matter of 
t'' is importance, sloe is entitled to a review of that decision by the 
~i2hest judicial ~odv in this state. 
fhe resp~nde~t loas also submitted that the petition to vacate 
tile: terPOinatior nrder vas precluded bv Section 55-10-108, U.C.A. 1953, 
'"' .:1coended. However, appellant's petition •,oas hrought under Section 
55-1(1-106 on the hasis that the original order itself was improper and 
erroneous, not on the basis of changed circumstances which would have 
been prohibited by Section 55-10-108. On Section 55-10-106 there is no 
··n~c1fic time period during <-1lich a modification or vacation of an order 
)1 
\ppellant's contention is that ·mder the totality of 
,, _\ l 'T''I 
.,t arhi ~hL' trial juJ~e ha\·L· al·Kll\)\.,,ledged that 
"'•'d at the Ct"'~ncl'.ISion of the Tanuary 9, 1975, 
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termination hearing that she had a right to appeal the t~rr.ination or.ler. 
(Respondent's Brief, 10). It is submitted that until the appellant kne· .• · 
of her right to appeal, which she did not, laches certainly Jnes not 
apply, nor does the one month appeal time begin to run, Respondent has 
suggested two mitigating factors, First, that the appellant, although 
not represented at the termination hearing itself, had representation at 
prior hearings. Why would she have any need to know of a right to appeal 
from the other prior proceedings? This is a specious argument because 
at the other hearings appellant did not lose her child. Respondent 
asserts that the appellant could have had representation at the termina-
tion hearing; however, there is not a shred of direct testimony nor 
evidence from the record to support this statement, and it is somewhat 
ridiculous to suggest that although the trial judge "said nothing about 
appeal at the conclusion of the January 9 hearing, In any event it is 
probable that he did so before the hearing." (Respondent's Brtef, 10!. 
Respondent has also chosen to characterize the failure to inform the 
appellant of the right to appeal as "insignificant and unprej ud icial." 
It is submitted that nothing could be farther from the truth, as is so 
tragically demonstrated by this very appeal. 
Secondly, respondent asserts that the appellant was aware of 
her right to appeal because the notice is gtven on ch~ summons she re-
ceived requiring her attendance at the January 9, 1975, hearing. l'hi·. 
argument meets neither the letter nor the sp1r1t of the la.,,· a' · ct "''t 
by either Section 55-10-96, U.C.A. l'JS;, a·. amellric·l, 'I [1 
which says: 
l. After the dispositional hean11g, the l<JOlll 
shall enter a11 dpprupridlt: .le( rt·t· 'I (il:--.jl(l'-,11 1 '''· 
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2. Aft~r entry of the decree, the Court shall 
•'%[•lC<in L" ~ party not represented by counsel 
h1s right to appeal the Court's decisi~n. 
iLr;lfillasis ,Jclded 1 
POINT III 
!HE APPELlANT'S PARENTAL RIGHTS WERE IMPROPERLY TERMINATED 
!HE JL".'i:::ILE COURT. 
Respondent has raised the valid argument that Section 
55-10-10911' (a l U,C .A. 1953, as amended, not only permits termination 
when parents are unfit or incompetent, but also when conditions seriously 
detrimental to the child are in existence. Respondent's brief on page 14 
lists five cc1nditionc til•.1Ught to be seriously detrimental to the child: 
'l 1 Ihc ch1l~ in ~~1~ care of appellant ~auld be t~u~eless. 
~t..: llnancial s:..1pport for the child. (31 1~te dt=-"Jel-
lac.t'' pdrento., ·,·erL u11o:illin~ to care tor the child. (4) The natural 
ar1J 1dd 'U .1.ncerst. 1S' -\nd that after 15 months 
there was no indication the circumstanc~:- . .:.~. 
The ar.;ument of "conditions seriously detrimental" to the 
child, however, skirts the real issues in regard to this juvenile mother. 
Were those conditions which existed on January 9, 1975, of the nature 
that they "'ere pen:1anent .' Could the conditions not have been corrected 
'~ \ ' r· . t l r:lt' '·'h~· \~·a...., :J '.::.ermination of appel-
ldlll '::. part:Illdl r 1 ~ :1t--~_·,J ,1n .!etrimental ..:,_)nJ1t1uns. necessary ,1n 
'd''' 1 ,, ' ]··-- ],1'-..._· \-,·rv c,>ndi tions had been eliminated by the 
1 r' 
hume 'llltil 1t '-L~L~lJ have been 
,j L·l t n\Jll ,L '.'lj,•lilt• ·lit' c~lll·,~ed "L·onditil1ns seriL1usly detrimental" 
·,,'1'(' 1o! t!JL2.t_' (rl(':.tiun~ h'ere 3tlS~rered 1 
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nor was any testimony offered or received on a ~i'l...:lE: ,)re ,f -,c 
important questions. The record is abso,utelv barren ~ '- l l { ~ 'l \ ,:_ 
support a finding that the conditions c.· lcJ •l.•t c•r .'c)•JL: 
and this court has previously ruled that ternnnatluL1 should only oe 
resorted to when the home situation would not or could not he correcte.J. 
Inez Pilling et al v. Donna Lance, 2J Ut.2d 407, 4b4 P.2d 395, at 3Y7 
(Utah 1970) 
As a policy matter, appellant submits that it is vitally im-
portant that in termination cases when parents are alleged unfit or 
incompetent or conditions are alleged to be "seriously detrimental" to .1 
child that the juvenile court be required to hear testimony after a f tl 1 
and complete investigation oy eit•.er IJJo or Ll1e c JrL 
showing that the incompetency or conditions are permanent ,,r so •erlO<' 
as to require termination; showing that there are 'h.l ·nallle alcen·ati· 
by which a natural parent's rights could be preotcrvec. ,.,,~·r··~ chat a 
juvenile parent's incompetency or conditions are not merely a function 
of the juvenile's temporary status; showing the court in cases of 
alleged voluntary termination and relinquishment of parental rights that, 
particularly in cases of juvenile mothers, there is no coercion trum tile 
juvenile's parents forcing such a de'-- isiotl. an·J sl~u·.~·.Ltl_' cl1L ._uurt t::1a 







J :__,_ icl:_ 
followed ar1y of these minimal steps in regard tu Lttl: rttatLer .tl IJdlt\t, 
-f)-
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tragic situation could probably have been avoided. The permanancy of a 
termination proceeding requires that it not be handled in a summary 
fashion, and appellant urges the Court to take this opportunity to estab-
lish specific guidelines for terminations of parental rights in the 
Juvenile Courts. 
The respondent also stated in point (5) of POINT III (Respon-
dent's Brief, 14; that at the April 22, 1976 hearing there was no indica-
tion the circumstances had changed permitting a revocation of the court's 
January 9, 1975, order. There was no such evidence only because the 
Juvenile Court refused to permit testimony from either the natural mother, 
or her parents, which would have supported the position and allegations 
of the appellant. Appellant objected, at the April 22, 1976 hearing, 
to this re:CJsal of the Juvenile Court to permit testimony into the record 
1n regard to the circcll:lstances surrounding the relinquishment of the 
child and the natural mc1ther' s present qualifications to have custody of 
11er child, and reasserts this as error on the part of the Juvenile Court. 
(Tr lb, April 22, 1976) 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT '.lAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT THE HEARING 
, 11; THE PETITION Tll TERNINATE HER PARENTAL RIGHTS. 
;;esp,,nJent 11as stated that appellant ;.·as 'lOt denied counsel 
because sl1e had been represented at prior hearings and Attorney Daines 
't'""' rea.':: tc' ap?ear '''Lh appellant at the January 9, 1975 hearing. 
;11" latl<'r ,catc•f'lcr.t '": respc1ndent is not supported bv the evidence. The 
.1 ,t 1 ,L''' 1 ,, 1• hl'[;.·cen l'•e appellant, the County Attornev, a DFS worker, 
- q-
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and the court regarding the mother's appearance without counsel. The 
Juvenile Court refused to hear rebuttal testimony on this poin~. and t!,c 
transcript of the April 22, 1976 hearing (page 12) clearly reflects the 
disagreement of the appellant. The appellant reasserts error on the 
part of the Court in refusing to hear testimony from the appellant on 
this issue. 
Again, respondent asserts appellant received notice of her 
right to counsel because it was printed on the summons received by the 
appellant requiring her appearance at the January 9, 1975 hearing. 
Again, this is a specious argument meeting neither the letter nor the 
spirit of the law. Section 55-10-109(2) requires actual, verbal advice 
of right to counsel. The record indicates quite clearly that this • ..Jas 
not done. 
Appellant also submits to the Court that it should be held 3• 
a matter of legal policy that terminations of parental rights ,,•ill not 
be permitted absent the appearance or appointment of counsel, particu-
larly in circumstances as presented here, where the parent in question 
was a juvenile, whose own parents had refused to appear with her before 
the Court, and who had no guidance or advice •Jpon which to rely in 
making such an important decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant asserts that she has had her parental ri ~l1t' 
improperly and unlawfully terminated. This uccurreJ ·vc;J.•t.•" L],,. I''V"P-
ile Court acted in a very casual manner \·Jhen it '-,() ~~~1n1ari l· tt·rr'·lnat l 1 
the parental rights of the appellant. l·.'e urge tl,c 1 ourl L<• t.1i·c· l'1J 
opportunity to formulate adequate ::._>-uidcline~ Ior I'ILIJrl~· lt~n~~in<...tl i·lll 
-10-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that this type of appeal need not come before this Court again. We also 
urge the Court to look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the termination of the juvenile mother's parental rights and rule that 
the termination order must be vacated, returning to the appellant her 
parental rights in Baby Girl Marie. 
F-:~·~,2.~ 
_/, Attorney for Appellant 
-11-
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